GitHub Actions Security Review

Find exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.

This skill encodes attack patterns from real GitHub Actions exploits — not generic CI/CD theory.

Scope

Review the workflows provided (file, diff, or repo). Research the codebase as needed to trace complete attack paths before reporting.

Files to Review

• .github/workflows/*.yml — all workflow definitions
• action.yml / action.yaml — composite actions in the repo
• .github/actions/*/action.yml — local reusable actions
• Config files loaded by workflows: CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, Makefile, shell scripts under .github/

Out of Scope

• Workflows in other repositories (only note the dependency)
• GitHub App installation permissions (note if relevant)

Threat Model

Only report vulnerabilities exploitable by an external attacker — someone without write access to the repository. The attacker can open PRs from forks, create issues, and post comments. They cannot push to branches, trigger workflow_dispatch, or trigger manual workflows.

Do not flag vulnerabilities that require write access to exploit:

• workflow_dispatch input injection — requires write access to trigger
• Expression injection in push-only workflows on protected branches
• workflow_call input injection where all callers are internal
• Secrets in workflow_dispatch/schedule-only workflows

Confidence

Report only HIGH and MEDIUM confidence findings. Do not report theoretical issues.

Confidence	Criteria	Action
HIGH	Traced the full attack path, confirmed exploitable	Report with exploitation scenario and fix
MEDIUM	Attack path partially confirmed, uncertain link	Report as needs verification
LOW	Theoretical or mitigated elsewhere	Do not report

For each HIGH finding, provide all five elements:

1. Entry point — How does the attacker get in? (fork PR, issue comment, branch name, etc.)
2. Payload — What does the attacker send? (actual code/YAML/input)
3. Execution mechanism — How does the payload run? (expression expansion, checkout + script, etc.)
4. Impact — What does the attacker gain? (token theft, code execution, repo write access)
5. PoC sketch — Concrete steps an attacker would follow

If you cannot construct all five, report as MEDIUM (needs verification).

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Step 1: Classify Triggers and Load References

For each workflow, identify triggers and load the appropriate reference:

Trigger / Pattern	Load Reference
pull_request_target	references/pwn-request.md
issue_comment with command parsing	references/comment-triggered-commands.md
${{ }} in run: blocks	references/expression-injection.md
PATs / deploy keys / elevated credentials	references/credential-escalation.md
Checkout PR code + config file loading	references/ai-prompt-injection-via-ci.md
Third-party actions (especially unpinned)	references/supply-chain.md
permissions: block or secrets usage	references/permissions-and-secrets.md
Self-hosted runners, cache/artifact usage	references/runner-infrastructure.md
Any confirmed finding	references/real-world-attacks.md

Load references selectively — only what's relevant to the triggers found.

Step 2: Check for Vulnerability Classes

Check 1: Pwn Request

Does the workflow use pull_request_target AND check out fork code?

• Look for actions/checkout with ref: pointing to PR head
• Look for local actions (./.github/actions/) that would come from the fork
• Check if any run: step executes code from the checked-out PR

Check 2: Expression Injection

Are ${{ }} expressions used inside run: blocks in externally-triggerable workflows?

• Map every ${{ }} expression in every run: step
• Confirm the value is attacker-controlled (PR title, branch name, comment body — not numeric IDs, SHAs, or repository names)
• Confirm the expression is in a run: block, not if:, with:, or job-level env:

Check 3: Unauthorized Command Execution

Does an issue_comment-triggered workflow execute commands without authorization?

• Is there an author_association check?
• Can any GitHub user trigger the command?
• Does the command handler also use injectable expressions?

Check 4: Credential Escalation

Are elevated credentials (PATs, deploy keys) accessible to untrusted code?

• What's the blast radius of each secret?
• Could a compromised workflow steal long-lived tokens?

Check 5: Config File Poisoning

Does the workflow load configuration from PR-supplied files?

• AI agent instructions: CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .cursorrules
• Build configuration: Makefile, shell scripts

Check 6: Supply Chain

Are third-party actions securely pinned to full SHAs?

• Pin third-party / external actions and reusable workflows only
• Do not flag first-party actions/* or github/* on version tags
• Do not flag same-repo / vendored (./.github/actions/...) as supply-chain pinning issues
• Only report when the job has secrets, OIDC, write token, release, deploy, package, or signing power — unprivileged read-only CI is not a finding

Check 7: Permissions and Secrets

Are workflow permissions minimal? Are secrets properly scoped?

Check 8: Runner Infrastructure

Are self-hosted runners, caches, or artifacts used securely?

Safe Patterns (Do Not Flag)

Before reporting, check if the pattern is actually safe:

Pattern	Why Safe
pull_request_target WITHOUT checkout of fork code	Never executes attacker code
${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} in run:	Numeric only — not injectable
${{ github.repository }} / github.repository_owner	Repo owner controls this
${{ secrets.* }}	Not an expression injection vector
${{ }} in if: conditions	Evaluated by Actions runtime, not shell
${{ }} in with: inputs	Passed as string parameters, not shell-evaluated
Third-party actions pinned to full SHA	Immutable reference
First-party actions/* / github/* on version tags	Outside third-party pinning policy — do not flag
Same-repo / vendored local actions	Not third-party supply chain (review pwn-request separately)
pull_request trigger (not _target)	Runs in fork context with read-only token
Any expression in workflow_dispatch/schedule/push to protected branches	Requires write access — outside threat model

Key distinction: ${{ }} is dangerous in run: blocks (shell expansion) but safe in if:, with:, and env: at the job/step level (Actions runtime evaluation).

Step 3: Validate Before Reporting

Before including any finding, read the actual workflow YAML and trace the complete attack path:

1. Read the full workflow — don't rely on grep output alone
2. Trace the trigger — confirm the event and check if: conditions that gate execution
3. Trace the expression/checkout — confirm it's in a run: block or actually references fork code
4. Confirm attacker control — verify the value maps to something an external attacker sets
5. Check existing mitigations — env var wrapping, author_association checks, restricted permissions, SHA pinning

If any link is broken, mark MEDIUM (needs verification) or drop the finding.

If no checks produced a finding, report zero findings. Do not invent issues.

Step 4: Report Findings

## GitHub Actions Security Review

### Findings

#### [GHA-001] [Title] (Severity: Critical/High/Medium)
- **Workflow**: `.github/workflows/release.yml:15`
- **Trigger**: `pull_